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1 Introduction 
 
Privacy International1 made the following statement regarding South Africa’s 
financial sector in its 2005 world survey: 
 
“South Africa has a well-developed financial system and banking 
infrastructure. Despite the sophistication of the financial sector, the privacy 
of financial information is weakly regulated by a code of conduct for banks 
issued by the Banking Council.” 
 
This extract highlights some of the problems South Africa are experiencing with its 
current status on privacy as viewed from an International perspective. In recent 
years the International society has stepped up its efforts in creating a global village 
wherein the individual could be assured of having his/her privacy protected. 
Various conventions and guidelines2 have previously laid the foundation for 
privacy but it was not until the European Union’s (EU) launch of its Directive on 
Data Protection in 1995 that we have seen a real coerced shift in the focus of such 
protection. Cross border data transfers from the EU became something of the past 
unless third countries (those countries outside the EU) could prove the existence 
of adequate data protection provisions. It seemed to a big extend that international 
trade would be hampered and some of its biggest trading partners, such as the 
US, suddenly felt the impact due to its lagging protection measures. In order to 
curtail such inadequacies, a Safe Harbor Agreement was entered into between the 
EU and US whereby cross border data flow would be allowed under certain 
prerequisites. This Agreement however, does not cover Financial Institutions. 
                                                 
1
 Privacy International (PI) is a human rights group formed in 1990 as a watchdog on surveillance and privacy invasions by 
governments and corporations. PI is based in London, England, and has an office in Washington, D.C. PI has conducted 
campaigns and research throughout the world on issues ranging from wiretapping and national security, to ID cards, video 
surveillance, data matching, medical privacy, and freedom of information and expression. Available at 
http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-65428 (17 August 2007).        
 
2
 a) The Council of Europe’s 1981 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data (CoE Convention); and  
b) the 1981 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Guidelines Governing the Protection of 
Privacy and Transborder Data Flows of Personal Data.  
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Concomitantly, South Africa, having the EU as its biggest trading partner also felt 
the grunt and some SA organizations had to take its processing to within the 
borders of the EU.3 By implication it was then assumed that South Africa lacked 
the adequacy criteria as laid down by the EU Directive on Data Protection.4 The 
South African Law Reform Commission (hereinafter referred to as SALRC) 
instructed a project committee to work on a draft Bill on Protection of Personal 
Information (hereinafter referred to as POPIA).  
 
Some of the reasons why, can best be explained as Prof Iain Currie5 reflects in his 
summary of the proposed POPIA:  
 
“South Africa has general privacy protection in the Bill of Rights [s 14]. The 
right is protected by a private law action to interdict current or anticipated 
privacy infringements or to recover damages for infringements that have 
already occurred. Though information privacy is encompassed in the 
constitutional protection of privacy, there is no specific legislative regulatory 
regime for this aspect of privacy. The Promotion of Access to Information 
Act 6protects personal information from disclosure in response to a request 
made in terms of the Act, but has no application outside the context of such 
a request. It is this absence of legislation that the SALRC draft Bill intends 
to remedy.” 
 
Although there is current legislation in place, none are specifically formulated to 
address data protection. For instance, The Electronic and Communication 
Transaction (ECT) Act of 20027 also addresses the collection of personal 
                                                 
3
 Nedbank (one of the big five banks in South Africa) has accordingly been forced, in the absence of such legislation locally 
which would have facilitated the bank processing information within South Africa, at great extra cost, to set up processing 
centres in Europe, in order to meet European information protection legislative requirements. This has resulted  
in the effective cost to market of the bank's outsourcing service being driven up and could very well be the reason for 
preventing the bank from obtaining further business processing outsourcing deals within Europe on the basis of not being 
cost competitive enough. (Comments on SALRC draft proposal) 
 
4
 Art 25(1) Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995. Also refer to Art 29 
Working Party’s Preparation of a methodology for evaluating the adequacy of the level of protection of individuals with 
regard to the processing of personal data. (Annex to the Annual Report 1998 (XV D/5047/98) of the working party 
established by Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC.) 
 
5
 The members of the Project Committee for this investigation are:  
 
6
 Act No. 54 of 2002. View www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2002/a54-02.pdf (12 August 2007) 
7
 Art 50(2) ECT Act. 
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information in its chapter 8 but subscription to such principles is voluntary. The 
Regulation of Interception of Communications (RIC) Act prohibits the interception 
of communications while one Act that has recently been enacted, The National 
Credit Act, makes specific provision for the regulation of personal information, 
although such regulation is restricted to the financial sector.  
 
Should the POPIA be enacted, consequential amendments may be necessary in 
respect of the following acts: Banking Act 38 of 1942, Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999, 
Copyright Act 98 of 1978, Electoral Act 73 of 1998, Financial Advisory and 
Intermediary Services Act (FAIS) 37 of 2002, Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
(FICA) 38 of 2001, Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communications Related Information Act 70 of 2002, Short-term Insurance Act 53 
of 1998, Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998 and Telecommunications Act 103 of 
1996.8 
 
This thesis will aim to address the proposed POPIA and the subsequent influence 
or impact it might have on the banking sector, by also taking into account some of 
the more recent developments as prescribed in Basel II and The National Credit 
Act, although not much time will be spent on this.  
 
It will proceed in several chapters, chapter 2 addressing the proposed co-
regulatory scheme. We will see how this might affect the current Code of Conduct 
as laid down by the Banking Council. The first half of this chapter will look at 
various models of co-regulatory schemes and the success achieved in the 
implementation of such schemes, while the second category will propose a draft 
code. Chapter 3 will examine the Trans Border Data Flow impact on the transfer of 
Bank Customer data outside the borders of South Africa and also the extent to 
which the inclusion of juristic persons would affect such transfer. Chapter 4 will 
evaluate how Basel II processing will influence banks’ current practice in terms of 
the POPIA.  
 
Lastly, in chapter 5 I will conclude by ascertaining whether there is a golden 
solution to some of the problems that were discussed in the previous chapters. 
                                                 
8
 SALRC Discussion papers available at http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/dpapers.htm (07 August 2007) 
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In doing so, it has to be emphasised that the proposed POPIA in its current 
version is still subject to change and where reference is made to specific sections, 
amendments might for future purposes render them obsolete. It is therefore my 
aim in addressing the various parts of this thesis based on the current version of 
the proposed POPIA, as is.  
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2 The current Banking Code of Practice and the proposed POPIA 
 
Codes offer flexibility and can be adapted to the specific economic, technological 
and regulatory contexts of different sectors. With or without legislation, codes will 
continue to be significant instruments by which organisational responsibilities are 
defined, employee obligations are communicated and citizen rights are 
established.9 
 
If the proposed POPIA is to follow a co-regulatory scheme as is proposed by the 
SALRC, then the question has to be asked whether the current banking code of 
practice will suffice. It also has to be taken into account whether the code is indeed 
fulfilling the requirements of the National Credit Act.  
The National Credit Act is consumer-protection legislation, aiming to regulate the 
market in consumer credit principally by improving access to credit and preventing 
unfair business practices.10 The provisions relating to data protection are found in 
Chapter 4, part B thereof. Section 68 of the Act creates a right to confidential 
treatment of ‘confidential information’ received, compiled, retained or reported in 
terms of the Act. Confidential information is defined in s 1 as ‘personal information 
that belongs to a person and is not generally available to or known by others’. The 
confidentiality of such information must be protected by its holder and must be 
used only for a lawful purpose, must be disclosed only to the person to whom it 
relates or to a third party where required by law, by court order or order of the 
Consumer Affairs Tribunal created by the Act or ‘as directed by . . . the instructions 
of the consumer’. 11 
                                                 
9
 Bennett CJ “The Protection of Personal Financial Information: An Evaluation of the Privacy Codes of the Canadian 
Bankers Association and the Canadian Standards Association” Prepared for the “Voluntary Codes Project” of the Office of 
Consumer Affairs Industry, Canada and Regulatory Affairs Treasury Board, March 1997 available at 
http://web.uvic.ca/polisci/bennett/  
 
10
 Currie, I “The Data Provisions of the National Credit Act” available at 
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/mi/privacy/nationalcreditact.htm (05 August 2007) 
 
11
 Id. 
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The Banking Association of South Africa revealed in March 2007 a code of 
conduct12 specifically aimed at the selling of unsecured credit. In its paragraph 2.9 
it states that it will comply with all relevant legislation and agreed Codes of 
Practice. It does however not make any specific mention of section 68 as 
contained in the National Credit Act.13 Since our main focus will revolve round the 
Banking Code of Practice, I will not pay any further attention to the said code of 
conduct.  
However, before it can be ascertain whether the Banking code of Practice will 
suffice, a synoptic review of the proposed POPIA will have to be done. 
 
In the SALRC’s discussion paper 109 on Privacy and Data Protection14 it states 
that the preliminary recommendations of the SALRC, as set out in the Bill can be 
summarised as follow:  
 
 a) Privacy and information protection should be regulated by a 
general information protection statute, with or without sector specific 
statutes, which will be supplemented by codes of conduct15 for the 
various sectors and will be applicable to both the public and private 
sector. Automatic and manual processing will be covered and 
identifiable natural and juristic persons will be protected [Chapter 2, 
clauses 3-6].  
 
 b) General principles of information protection should be developed 
and incorporated in the legislation. The proposed Bill gives effect to 
eight core information protection principles, namely processing 
                                                 
12
 See: http://www.banking.org.za/documents/2007/MARCH/InfoDoc_34753.pdf (03August 2007) 
 
13
 68. (1) Any person who, in terms of this Act, receives, compiles, retains or reports any confidential information pertaining 
to a consumer or prospective consumer must protect the confidentiality of that information, and in particular, must- 
(a) use that information only for a purpose permitted or required in terms of this Act, other national legislation or applicable 
provincial legislation; and 
(b) report or release that information only to the consumer or prospective consumer, or to another person- 
(i) to the extent permitted or required by this Act, other national legislation or applicable provincial legislation; or 
(ii) as directed by- 
(aa) the instructions of the consumer or prospective consumer; or 
(bb) an order of a court or the Tribunal. 
(2) Failure by a credit bureau to comply with a notice issued in terms of section 55, in relation to this section, is an offence.  
 
14
 Project 124, October 2005, Privacy and Data Protection.  
 
15
 Own emphasis added. 
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limitation, purpose specification, further processing limitation, 
information quality, openness, security safeguards, individual 
participation and accountability.16 Provision is made for exceptions to 
the information protection principles [Chapter 3, Part A, clauses 7-
23]. Exemptions are furthermore possible for specific sectors in 
applicable circumstances [Chapter 4, clauses 32-33]. Special 
provision has furthermore been made for the protection of special 
(sensitive) personal information [Chapter 3, Part B, clauses 24-31].  
 
 c) A statutory regulatory agency should be established. Provision 
has been made for an independent Information Protection 
Commission with a full-time Information Commissioner to direct the 
work of the Commission [Chapter 5, Part A, clauses 34-46]. The 
Commission will be responsible for the implementation of both the 
Protection of Personal Information Act (see Annexure B) and the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000. Data subjects will be 
under an obligation to notify the Commission of any processing of 
personal information before they undertake such processing 
[Chapter 6, Part A, clauses 47-51] and provision has also been 
made for prior investigations to be conducted where the information 
being collected warrants a stricter regime [Chapter 6, Part B, 
clauses 52-53].  
 
 d) Enforcement of the Bill will be through the Commission using as a 
first step a system of notices where conciliation or mediation has not 
been successful. Failure to comply with the notices will be a criminal 
offence. The Commission may furthermore assist a data subject in 
claiming compensation from a responsible party for any damage 
suffered. Obstruction of the Commission’s work is regarded in a very 
serious light and constitutes a criminal offence [Chapter 8, clauses 
63-87 and Chapter 9, clauses 88-92].  
 
                                                 
16
  8 
 e) A flexible approach should be followed in which industries will 
develop their own codes of conduct (in accordance with the 
principles set out in the legislation) which will be overseen by the 
regulatory agency. Codes of conduct for individual sectors may be 
drawn up for specific sectors on the initiative of the specific sector or 
of the Commission itself.17 This will include the possibility of making 
provision for an adjudicator to be responsible for the supervision of 
information protection activities in the sector. The Commission will, 
however, retain oversight authority. Although the codes will 
accurately reflect the information protection principles as set out in 
the Act, it should furthermore assist in the practical application of the 
rules in a specific sector [Chapter 7, clauses 54-62].  
 
 f) It is the Law Commission’s objective to ensure that the legislation 
provides an adequate level of information protection in terms of the 
EU Directive. In this regard a provision has been included that 
prohibits the transfer of personal information to countries that do not, 
themselves, ensure an adequate level of information protection 
[Chapter 10, clause 94].  
 
In both paragraphs a) and e) reference are made to codes of conduct. It is 
therefore unmistakably clear that South Africa will incorporate a co-regulatory 
scheme. 
 
Currently, the Banking Code of Practice as provided for by the Banking 
Organisation of South Africa and to which all South African banks subscribe, is not 
legally binding. This flows from its introductory paragraph which states the 
following: 
None of the provisions of this Code: 
• will be legally binding in any court of law; 
                                                 
17
 Emphasis added. 
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• may be used to influence the interpretation of the legal relationship 
between you and your bank; 
• will give rise to a trade custom or tacit contract or otherwise between 
you and your bank.18 
In New Zealand, the approach is that codes of practice under its Privacy Act have 
the force of law. A breach of a ratified code of practice is as serious as a breach of 
the information privacy principles expressed in the law, which would then trigger 
the complaints and enforcement procedures in the legislation.19 Although the 
Dutch system is similar in most respects to that in New Zealand, the codes are not 
formally binding on the courts. The proposed POPIA makes provision for codes in 
its section 62 to be legally binding. 
 
In Australia an organisation or industry registering a Privacy Code under the 
Australian Privacy Act, must prove and be legally accountable for the Code 
providing at least the same level of protection that the ten National Privacy 
Principles of the Australian Privacy Act require – preferably more.20 
 
The current South African code of practice in itself is not a Privacy Code and only 
makes provision in its paragraphs 4.5 – 4.7 for aspects related to the protection 
and processing of personal information.21 It is also evident that the eight core 
information protection principles as proposed by the POPIA, namely processing 
limitation, purpose specification, further processing limitation, information quality, 
openness, security safeguards, individual participation and accountability, are not 
all accounted for in the relevant paragraphs of the code.  
 
In terms of Section 54(2) (a) of the proposed POPIA, a code of conduct must 
incorporate all the information protection principles22 or set out obligations that, 
                                                 
18
 View at http://www.banking.org.za/consumer_information/consumer_information.htm (04 August 2007) 
 
19
 See Part VI of the New Zealand Privacy Act. 
 
20
 Comments on SALRC draft proposal by Michalsons. 
 
21
 View at http://www.banking.org.za/consumer_information/consumer_information.htm (05 August 2007) 
 
 
22
 A good example of a code of conduct that incorporates all the information protection principles was the 1996 Canadian 
Bankers Association Privacy Model Code. See discussion at http://web.uvic.ca/~polisci/bennett/research/cba.htm. (06 
August 2007) 
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overall, are the equivalent of all the obligations set out in those principles23.  A new 
Banking Code of Privacy is suggested that solely reflects these principles 
wherefrom a customer could then draw clear distinction on how his/her information 
would be processed without having to review the proposed POPIA in itself. In 
Section 54 (2) (b) of the proposed POPIA it states that a code of conduct must 
prescribe how the information protection principles are to be applied, or are to be 
complied with, given the particular features of the sector or sectors of society in 
which these bodies are operating. This in itself will create consumer trust and 
make the POPIA more practically accessible by members of the public, ensuring 
its enforcement through knowledge. I dare say this based on the fact that 
members of the public are much more prepared in accessing codes located on a 
website, explained in laymen terms, than making a concerted effort in trying to 
analyse an Act.  
 
The proposed POPIA states in its Section 54 (3) that a code of conduct may apply 
in relation to any one or more of the following – 
 
(a) any specified information or class or classes of information; 
(b) any specified body or class or classes of bodies; 
(c) any specified activity or class or classes of activities; 
(d) any specified industry, profession, or calling or class or classes of 
industries. 
 
It is generally recognised that five kinds of privacy code can be identified 
according to their scope of application:  organisational code, the sector code, the 
functional code, the professional code and the technological code.24 It is therefore 
suggested that the Banking Industry in South Africa, would fall under the sector 
code25, since the defining feature thereof is that there is a broad consonance of 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
 
23
 A further example of a code of conduct that set out obligations that, overall, are the equivalent of all the obligations set out 
in those principles is the Netherlands Code of Conduct for the Processing of Personal Data by Financial Institutions. 
 
24
 Project 124, October 2005, Privacy and Data Protection. 
 
25
 As allowed for by Section 54(3)(d) of the proposed POPIA. 
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economic interest and function and a similarity in the kinds of personal information 
collected.  
 
The approach envisaged by the proposed POPIA seems to be on par with the co-
regulatory scheme of Australia where any business or profession may develop a 
Code of Practice. The code must then be submitted to the Privacy Commissioner 
for approval. If the Code is deemed to be acceptable then the Commissioner may 
issue it.26  
 
Section 55 (1) of the proposed POPIA states that the Commission may27 issue a 
code of conduct under section 54 of the said Act on the Commission’s own 
initiative or on the application of any person. Caution should however be thrown to 
the fact that this process in Australia has gone extremely slow with a relatively few 
number of businesses feeling the need to develop a Code of Conduct, relying 
solely on the Privacy Principles as set out in the Act.28 If the same phenomenon 
plays itself out in the South African process, and the Commission becomes 
reluctant in issuing codes, the full effect or intention of the Act might never 
materialise. All of this will be due to an absence of knowledge on behalf of the 
consumer, or due to the lack of sector specific interpretation of the Act. It is 
suggested that the banking sector takes a pro-active role in submitting its own 
code of conduct instead of waiting on the Commissioner to suggest application or 
issue a code of its own. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 See Part IIIA of the Australian Privacy Act 1988 as amended. 
 
27
 Own emphasis added. 
 
28
 See: http://privacy.gov.au/business/codes/index.html (05 August 2007) 
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3 Trans Border Data Flow impact on transfer of bank data 
 
Having the EU as its biggest trading partner, South Africa had to find a way in 
ensuring that its own proposed POPIA would fulfil the adequacy requirement as 
laid down in the EC Directive on Data Protection. In achieving this aim, a provision 
has been included that prohibits the transfer of personal information to countries 
that do not, themselves, ensure an adequate level of information protection.29 
Although this in itself seems to be justified with regard to the EU, it might cause 
serious implications for those trading partners and countries outside South Africa 
that do not have adequate levels of protection. Such an argument was posed by 
the Credit Bureau Association of South Africa in its submission to the SALRC:    
 
“The majority of African States, if not all, have no information privacy 
legislation in place and subjectively it is foreseen that with the problems of 
the continent being what they are, the introduction of such legislation will 
not be seen for some considerable time. South Africa is presently 
increasing its presence on the continent and many South Africa 
organisations have offices throughout Africa. In effect this will mean that 
South Africa would isolate itself from the rest of the continent in its attempt 
to blindly follow directives designed for economies far removed from Africa 
and South Africa.”  
 
To accommodate these fears certain exemptions, parallel to that of the EC 
Directive, were made. The relevant provision as embodied in Section 94 of the 
POPIA reads as follow: 
 
A responsible party in South Africa may transfer personal information about a data 
subject to someone (other than the responsible party or the data subject) who is in 
a foreign country only if – 
                                                 
29
 Refer paragraph f), p 8 above. 
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(a) the recipient of the information is subject to a law, binding scheme or 
contract which effectively upholds principles for fair handling of the 
information that are substantially similar to the Information Protection 
Principles set out in Chapter 3 of this Act; or 
 
(b) the data subject consents to the transfer; or 
 
(c) the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the 
individual and the organisation, or for the implementation of pre-contractual 
measures taken in response to the data subject’s request; or 
 
(d) the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract 
concluded in the interest of the individual between the organisation and a 
third party; or 
 
(e) all of the following apply: 
(i) the transfer is for the benefit of the individual; 
(ii) it is reasonably impracticable to obtain the consent of the data 
subject to that transfer; 
(iii) if it were reasonably practicable to obtain such consent, the 
individual would be likely to give it. 
 
For the purposes of this article it is important to understand the impact these 
exceptions might have on the Banking Industry. I will proceed by identifying three 
possible banking problems. The first being the prevention of fraud, the second 
being the execution of payment orders and the third relating to the transfer of legal 
persons’ data. 
 
3.1 Prevention of Fraud 
 
Legislation was introduced in South Africa in 2003, aimed at preventing money-
launderers, criminals and terrorists from abusing the country's financial system. 
The purpose of this legislation in the form of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 
  14 
(FICA)30 is to protect all legal investments and finances and identify and prosecute 
all those involved in money laundering activities. 
 
“South Africa has set itself a higher standard than even the United States 
and the United Kingdom. The South African Fica standard demands that all 
existing clients have to be Fica’d, whereas in the US and UK, for instance, it 
is only high-risk clients who had to be verified. 
 
It is understood that South Africa chose this route because, as the only 
African member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) on money-
laundering, it was keen to show it could meet a higher standard.”31 
 
Murray Michell, director of the South African Financial Intelligence Centre said in 
the same article that there is nothing in the law that prevents sharing Fica 
information but it is an issue between industries of shared costs and systems.. 
This would then imply that any bank customer’s information under current 
legislation might be shared amongst industries and authorities, regardless of 
where in the world.  
 
This statement is underlined in FICA’s section 3(2)(b) where it states that apart 
from the Financial Intelligence Centre’s principle objectives, some of its other 
objectives is to exchange information with similar bodies in other countries 
regarding money laundering activities and similar offences. 
 
This is in line with how payment card organizations and banks which adhere to 
card payment schemes aim at protecting their customers and prevent fraud on a 
worldwide basis. They exchange information on individuals, for example, 
information on: 
 
                                                 
30
 Act Nr 38 of 2001, view www.fic.gov.za/info/a38-01b.pdf (07 August 2007) 
 
31
 Fica’d to death, Mail and Guardian Online, 31 July 2006, view 
http://www.mg.co.za/personalfinance/articlePage.aspx?articleid=279307&area=/personal_finance/pers_fin_banking/ (07 
August 2007) 
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• merchants participating in card payment schemes who default or have 
committed fraud; 
• persons convicted or suspect of fraud (identifying data, type of fraud). 
 
Information such as contained in these examples is exchanged at a worldwide 
level since criminal organisations specialising in card-based fraud operate 
throughout the globe and move their centre of activities according to the 
circumstances.32 
 
The question would then arise as to whether such exchanging of information to 
third countries (specifically in Africa) that don’t provide adequate data protection 
measures, would be legal in terms of the exclusions as is envisaged in the POPIA.  
 
It is my opinion that none of the above exceptions authorise the transfer by banks 
of data to these countries for the prevention of fraud. If provision was made for a 
paragraph in the exclusions that would have read similar to that of Article 26(d) of 
the EC Directive; 
 
(d) the transfer is necessary or legally required on important public interest 
ground… 
 
then maybe one could have argued that a measure to combat fraud would indeed 
have been interpreted as necessary based upon an important public interest. 
 
Since none of the other African countries contain any adequate measures, one 
would then, in the absence of such a paragraph, have to argue that in terms of 
Section 94(a) the receiving country might be subject to a binding scheme33 or 
contract which effectively upholds principles for fair handling of the information that 
are substantially similar to the Information Protection Principles set out in Chapter 
3 of the proposed POPIA.  
                                                 
32
 Professor Jan M.A. Berkvens and Marc N. Schauss; The Amended proposal for an EC Directive on Data Protection; 
Progress on the face of it, disillusion after scrutiny ; Butterworth’s Journal of International Banking and Financial Law, 1993, 
February. 
33
 Own emphasis added. 
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On September 17, 2006 the leaders of the African Development Bank Group, the 
Asian Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the European Investment Bank Group, the Inter-American 
Development Bank Group, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank 
Group agreed on a framework for preventing and combating fraud and corruption 
in the activities and operations of their institutions. This built on the work of a joint 
Task Force that was established on February 18, 2006 by the leaders of these 
institutions.  
 
The institutions recognized that corruption undermines sustainable economic 
growth and that it is a major obstacle to the reduction of poverty. The leaders 
have outlined the following joint actions to combat fraud and corruption:  
● agreement in principle on standardized definitions of fraudulent and 
corrupt practices for investigating such practices in activities financed by 
the member institutions;  
● agreement on common principles and guidelines34 for investigations;  
● agreement to strengthen the exchange of information, as appropriate 
and with due attention to confidentiality35, in connection with 
investigations into fraudulent and corrupt practices;  
● agreement on general integrity due diligence principles relating to private 
sector lending and investment decisions;  
● agreement to explore further how compliance and enforcement actions 
taken by one institution can be supported by the others.  
Further, the institutions have agreed on continuing to work together to assist their 
member countries in strengthening governance and combating corruption, in 
cooperation with civil society, the private sector, and other stakeholders and 
institutions such as the press and judiciary with the goal to enhance transparency 
and accountability. 36 
                                                 
34
 Id. 
 
35
 Id. 
 
36
 See http://www.adb.org/Media/Articles/2006/10629-regional-anticorruption/joint-statement.pdf (09 August 2007) 
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This framework might path the way to binding schemes as is proposed under 
Section 94(a) of the proposed POPIA, since most countries in Africa are members 
of the African Development Bank Group. It might also clear up the road for 
exchanging information to other countries outside Africa that don’t have adequate 
protection measures. 
 
The analogy that I am drawing from is that in the absence of having any 
clarification on what is meant by binding schemes, one has to purport that the 
drafters, having largely based their research and draft legislation inter alia on the 
EC Directive on Data Protection37, must have had binding corporate rules in mind.  
 
The UK’s Information Commissioner’s legal analysis and recommended approach 
to assessing adequacy including consideration of the issue of contractual 
solutions, binding corporate rules and Safe Harbour, sketches a good review of 
what Binding Corporate Rules entail:38 
 
“The concept of using Binding Corporate Rules (BCR) to create adequate 
safeguards for the purposes of Article 26(2) was devised by the Article 29 
Working Party in its working document on binding corporate rules, adopted 
on 3 June 2003 (‘WP74’)39. Subsequently, to assist with compliance, the 
Article 29 Working Party developed a model checklist on the content of a 
BCR application to Data Protection Authorities (‘model checklist’)and a co-
operation procedure to facilitate the authorisation process (the ‘co-operation 
procedure’). 
 
                                                 
37
 “Besides the international instruments, two national data protection laws have been particularly influential in the drafting of 
the Commission's proposed Bill. These instruments are the Netherlands' Wet Bescherming Persoonsgegevens (2000) 
(conforming closely to the EU Directive) and the New Zealand Privacy Act (1993) (conforming closely to the OECD 
Guidelines).” About the draft protection of Information Bill, I Currie, see 
http://wwwserver.law.wits.ac.za/mi/privacy/briefing.htm  (11 August 2007) 
 
38
 View 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/data_protection/detailed_specialist_guides/international_transfers_legal_gui
dance_v2.0_300606.pdf (10 August 2007) 
 
39
 Working Document (WP74) Transfers of personal data to third countries: Applying Article 26(2) of the EU Data Protection 
Directive to Binding Corporate Rules for International Data Transfers, 11639/02/EN WP 74 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp74_en.pdf. (10 August 2007) 
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BCR are internal codes of conduct operating within a multinational 
organisation for the purposes of enabling transfer of data outside the EEA 
(but within the group) to be made on a basis which ensures adequate 
safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects for the purposes of 
paragraph 9 of Schedule 4 to the Act. They are designed to be a global 
solution for multinational companies by ensuring their intra-group transfers 
comply with the Eighth Principle and providing a simple mechanism for 
obtaining the necessary authorisations across the EU. BCR must be 
submitted for approval by the Commissioner in order to obtain an 
authorisation which provides that transfers from the UK may be made within 
the group on the basis of the BCR.”40 
 
In light of the above, it is my opinion that a binding scheme, derived from the 
abovementioned framework, read as BCR, could in fact attribute to possibly the 
only short term solution in combating fraud and other illegal activities, without 
contravening the proposed POPIA. In the absence thereof, banks might be 
reluctant to report fraud due to its fear of contravening the POPIA. An example of 
such reluctance is found in Europe where the payment card sector’s national and 
cross-border fraud prevention databases rely on input from banks. As the EU 
Data Protection Directive is not applied in the same way in all national legislation, 
banks in certain Member States have been reluctant to report fraudulent 
merchants to these databases, as they were concerned about possible breaches 
of national data protection laws. In view of the ever increasing numbers of fraud, 
the EU Committee of Data Protection Authorities (“Article 29 Working Party”) has 
endorsed guidelines on the collection and processing of data on merchants whose 
contracts to accept payment cards have been terminated. The guidelines will help 
banks prevent fraud and ensure that merchants’ privacy is better protected. 
Databases on “terminated” merchants are very important for the banking industry. 
However, the transfer of data to non-EU countries is not covered by the 
guidelines. The card schemes will carry out these transfers in compliance with the 
                                                 
40
 Ibid note 38. 
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rules in the Data Protection Directive, including by using standard contractual 
clauses. The banks have asked the Commission to re-establish legal certainty.41 
 
3.2 Execution of Payment Orders42 
 
Within the framework of their service, financial institutions in South Africa 
exchange personal data with subsidiaries and other financial institutions 
established outside South Africa. This relates in particular to transactions relating 
to the settlement of orders from customers or potential customers. These orders 
may reach a financial institution in the form of regular orders, but also in the form 
of electronic orders or requests for information through the Internet. The 
processing of personal data relating to such orders falls within the scope of the 
processing definition as set out in the proposed POPIA. 
 
Similarly, a payment order is an order directing transfer of funds to a designated 
account or beneficiary. Payment orders may be sent by mail (or private courier), 
telex message, or through the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunication (Swift), a communication network widely used in international 
banking. The execution of a payment order therefore may imply the intervention of 
several banks. One will have the originating bank, the beneficiary bank and 
sometimes, if necessary, intermediary banks. There might also possibly be a card 
payment organization.  
 
All the necessary information related to the originator of the order and the 
beneficiary, will be processed by the banks. Such information processed identifies 
the originator and the beneficiary in the form of their account numbers, names and 
addresses and it will often also identify the reason for payment. To successfully 
process a payment order, all the banks involved must transmit both data for the 
purposes of identification and any messages which accompany the payment 
order. The originating bank and the beneficiary’s bank must perform accounting 
                                                 
41
 See 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/246&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=
en (12 August 2007) 
 
42
 Most of what is argued here in is derived from an article that was written in the February 1993 Butterworth’s Journal of 
International Banking and Financial Law, titled; The Amended proposal for an EC Directive on Data Protection; Progress on 
the face of it, disillusion after scrutiny by Professor Jan M.A. Berkvens and Marc N. Schauss. 
  20 
operations relating to the debiting of the originator’s account and the crediting of 
the beneficiary’s account respectively.  
 
It could be queried whether the processing and subsequent transfer inherent in the 
execution of payment orders are adequately covered by any of the exceptions as 
referred to above in Section 94 of the proposed POPIA. It is also not clear from 
this section whether the data subjects referred to are South African citizens, South 
African residents or also residents of third countries. Since the execution of a 
payment order generally involves at least two data subjects (as seen above), if 
residents of third countries which do not ensure an adequate level of protection 
are to be protected, then the transfer which is envisaged must fall within one of the 
five categories of exceptions mentioned earlier with respect to all data subjects 
involved. These exceptions will be dealt with separately here. I will deal with the 
first exception mentioned under the POPIA, lastly. 
 
3.2.1 Data subject consent to transfer 
 
There were various interpretations of consent in the SALRC’s discussion paper 
109 chapter 4 which deals with the information principles.43 I will highlight some of 
these.  
 
It was for instance contended that consent for the processing of nonsensitive 
information will be regarded as valid if it amounts to a freely given, specific and 
informed indication of the wishes (volunté) of the data subject - but that this 
volunté can be expressed in a variety of ways and that (other than with regard to 
sensitive information, for which it needs to be express) it does not necessarily 
need to be put in writing. Thus, for instance, if a person was informed of an 
intention on the part of a responsible party to use his (non-sensitive) information 
for a specific purpose, and was offered an opportunity to object to this use (e.g., by 
means of a negative tick-box on a form), yet did not use this opportunity (i.e. by 
                                                 
43
 See 
http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/dp109_prj124/CH%204%20PRINCIPLES%20OF%20INFORMATION%20PROTECTIO
N.pdf (13 August 2007) 
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returning the form without the box being ticked), his consent to the use of his 
information can be inferred from this (in) action. 
 
In Issue Paper 24 the question was posed whether the opt-out approach would 
constitute valid consent. Responses were varied. It was argued that the "opt-out" 
approach implies implicit consent; and would constitute valid consent, provided it 
meets all the criteria of implied consent required by the common law and set out in 
the privacy instruments. The banking industry explained that it has adopted the 
opt-out approach44 since there is no clear guidance in South African legislation as 
to how the ‘consent’ issue should be addressed and also because of the 
prohibitive costs and administration should consent have to be sought for each 
and every application of personal information. 
It was argued that a clear distinction is necessary between the use of personal 
information for marketing of services and products, and the use for processing 
product applications, verification of personal details, credit assessment, fraud 
prevention and statutory reporting obligations (FICA for instance). In order to make 
the distinction clear, the Banking Council has, for instance, treated marketing of 
products and other uses of personal information separately in the new Code of 
Banking Practice.45  
                                                 
44
 In the new Code of Banking Practice, effective from June 2004, the consent issue is dealt with as follows: 
“4.7.1 Information about your personal debts and/or the manner in which you conduct your accounts may, in appropriate 
circumstances, be disclosed to credit risk management services where: 
- you have fallen behind with your payments or you are in default with the terms of a product or service, and you 
have not made satisfactory proposals to us for repayment of your debt following formal demand and you have 
been given at least 28 calendar days’ notice of our intention to disclose; or 
- you have given us written, electronic or in the case of telephone banking, verbal consent; or 
- your cheque is referred to drawer, in which case the information may be placed on a cheque verification service. 
4.7.2 In respect of the marketing of services or products if you are: 
- a new client, we will obtain your consent at the beginning of your relationship with us; 
- an existing client we will inform you that you may withhold or withdraw your consent and how to exercise that choice. If you 
do not withhold your consent, we will presume that you agree to us continuing to market the services 
or products With your consent we may: 
- bring to your attention details of our services and products, which may be of interest to you; 
- give certain information about you to other subsidiaries within our group for marketing purposes; 
- inform you about another company's services or products and, if you respond positively, you may be contacted directly by 
that company. 
We will not pressurise you by suggesting that access to any our services and products is conditional upon your consent”. 
 
45
 Confidentiality and privacy 
We will treat all your information as private and confidential (even when you are no longer a client). Except as set out in 
4.7.1 below, we will not disclose any information about your accounts or your personal details to anyone, including other 
companies in our group, other than in four exceptional cases permitted by law. These are: 
- where we are legally compelled to do so; 
- where it is in the public interest to disclose; 
- where our interests require disclosure (This will not be used as a reason for disclosing information about you or 
your accounts [including your name and address] to anyone else including other companies in our group for 
marketing purposes); 
- where disclosure is made at your request or with your written or verbal consent. If you make use of electronic 
banking facilities like telephone banking, and the telephone calls are recorded, consent to disclosure might be recorded 
verbally. 
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It was submitted that an opt-out approach represents a proportional balance 
between protecting a consumer's privacy and the reality of modern business 
marketing strategies. It was furthermore stated that this approach is similar to the 
approach suggested in Article 14 of the EU Directive in respect of the data 
subject's right to object.46 A consumer should be able to opt out at any time 
subject to reasonable limits, e.g. giving the company reasonable time to make the 
opt out effective.47 
It was, however, noted that the question about opt-in versus opt-out forms of 
consent is one that has become particularly pressing, given the USA’s recent 
federal legislation about spam117(H.R.2515 Anti-Spam Act of 2003).48 
One of the clearest arguments against allowing opt-out in this context has been 
written by David Harris. His argument is simple (and has been used by others as 
well) that by legitimising optout it becomes an acceptable option for business to 
send unsolicited marketing material as long as they allow recipients to opt-out. 
This can potentially require so much effort from the recipient, that the recipient can 
be effectively overwhelmed by the number of received e-mails.4950It was concluded 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
5.1 Provision of credit 
5.1.1 We will market and approve credit responsibly (based on the information you supply to us), to match your 
borrowing requirements and capabilities and supply you with suitable products, in an attempt to ensure that you are not 
extended beyond your financial means. However, our ability to do so depend on your compliance with our expectations of 
you set out in 5.11.4 regarding your financial affairs. 
5.1.2 All lending will be subject to an assessment of your ability to afford and willingness to repay. This assessment may 
include:  
- taking into account your income and expenses, including the dependability of your income; 
- how you handled your financial affairs in the past; 
- information obtained from credit risk management services and related services, and other appropriate parties, for 
example, employers, other lenders and landlords; 
- how you have conducted your previous and existing accounts with us; 
- information supplied by you, including verification of your identity and the purpose of the borrowing; 
- credit assessment techniques, for example, credit scoring;” 
 
46
 A specific right to object is laid down in some data protection laws. The EU Directive contains important instances of such 
a right, namely in Art 14 (a) (right to object to data processing generally), Art 14(b) (right to object to direct marketing) and , 
most innovatively, Art 15 (1) (right to object to decisions based on fully automated assessments of one’s personal 
character). These rights to object are not found in other main international data protection instruments; See Chapter 11 of 
the Bill dealing with the rights of the data subject.(See however, the ILO Code of Practice on Protection of Workers’ 
Personal Data). Neither have they existed in the bulk of national laws though this situation no longer pertains in Europe due 
to the adoption of the Directive; Bygrave Data Protection at 66. 
 
47
 Comments made by Sanlam Life; Legal Service. 
 
48
 Comments by Prof Martin Olivier. 
 
49
 Id. 
 
50
 Another example referred to by Prof Olivier, is that it is currently possible to opt-out of cookie-collection by DoubleClick — 
one of the largest collectors of web-related consumer behaviour. However, most consumers will neither be able to establish 
how to opt-out, nor understand the technology involved to opt-out (and therefore find it hard to establish whether opting out 
is a safe proposition). Worse, one can just imagine the effort required to locate and opt-out of all such services. And it is 
hard to imagine what new services will be established in future; again expecting the consumer to keep abreast of such new 
services and opting out of each is unrealistic. I suggest that the possibility to opt-out is not a valid form of consent for any 
‘service’ that directly affects the consumer, such as sending unsolicited bulk e-mail. The case where it potentially has an 
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that the way in which the consent provision is to be implemented will have to be 
set out in the codes of conduct of the different sectors as approved by the 
Information Commissioner, or in relevant regulations. 
 
The question which remains is whether the definition of consent makes allowance 
for “implied consent” (tacit consent) in the banking sector. 
 
Section 2 of the POPIA states that “consent” means any freely-given, specific 
and informed expression of will whereby data subjects agree to the processing of 
personal information relating to them.51 
 
In reviewing the Oxford English Dictionary it is interesting to note that the adjective 
“express” is explained as “stated clearly” but also as “specific” which in itself is 
described as “clearly defined or identified” and “precise and clear”. “Informed” in 
the abovementioned dictionary can be interpreted as “having or showing 
knowledge”. 
 
To bring it into context, for consent to be valid, it has to be specific (i.e. it should 
relate to a specific piece of data processing by a specific responsible party for 
clearly defined purposes) and informed52 (i.e. that the data subject must have had 
certain information at his disposal, principally knowledge of the potential recipients 
of the data). 
 
It is therefore my opinion, unlike some of the other opinions as discussed above, 
that a data subject’s consent to transfer, as required by section 94 (b) of the 
POPIA, has to be express consent.  
 
It is doubtful whether it can be deduced from the fact that the originator has issued 
a payment order to which he has given his express indication of his consent. 
Indeed, whilst the originator may be viewed as having acquiesced to his bank 
                                                                                                                                                    
indirect effect on consumers — such as when tracking cookies are placed on a user’s disk — is more problematic and 
needs serious discussion to attempt to identify. 
51
 I draw conclusion from this that this definition will also be relevant to the transfer of information on data subjects. 
 
52
 Section 2 of the POPIA “consent” means any freely-given, specific and informed expression of will whereby data 
subjects agree to the processing of personal information relating to them. 
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performing the processing and subsequent transfer implicit in giving the payment 
order, his consent is however tacit. Beyond transfer, the same is true with regards 
to the processing performed by any other banks involved. It also applies to the 
processing of data relating to the beneficiary and any third parties mentioned on 
the payment order. 
 
It is therefore unlikely that a payment order can be issued without obtaining the 
express consent of the data subject which is as illustrated above, not common 
practice in the issuing of payment orders. It is also unlikely whether the consent of 
the beneficiary (which is also classified as a data subject) could have been 
acquired.  
 
3.2.2 The transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the 
individual and the organisation, or for the implementation of pre-contractual 
measures taken in response to the data subject’s request 
 
This exception can be read in two parts, that which relates to the performance of a 
contract and the second part of the exception which makes provision for transfers 
made in the framework of pre-contractual measures. This second part does not 
apply since payment orders are generally not executed within such a framework. I 
will therefore focus on the first part. 
 
What is strikingly remarkable about this and other exceptions is the fact that the 
drafters have opted to make use of the words individual and organisation, words to 
which no definitions are ascribed to in the proposed POPIA. In the absence 
thereof, it seems to be the logical approach that they should be open for 
interpretation, and if compared with Article 26 (1) of the EC Directive on Data 
Protection, for the purposes of this article be read as data subject and responsible 
party53, respectively. However, it might also be argued that the drafters had 
specifically refrained from using these words in order to allow for either the 
individual or the organisation to fulfil the role of the responsible party and maybe 
even that of processor. I will illustrate this point at the hand of the EC Directive on 
Data Protection.  
                                                 
53
 This has a similar meaning than data controller in the EC Directive. 
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Art 26(1)(b) of the EC Directive reads as follow: The transfer is necessary for the 
performance of a contract between the data subject and the controller…. 
 
This article is ambiguous in its wording. An important question is whether a 
transfer by an intermediary bank might be authorised on the basis of the contract 
between the originator of the payment order and his bank. The wording refers to a 
contract between the data subject and the controller rather than to a contract 
between a data subject and a controller. This would make it clear that transfers 
necessary to perform a contract between the data subject and a controller are 
authorised even when executed by a controller who is not party to a contract with 
the data subject. In case the payment is then routed through an intermediary bank, 
it is the latter (also a controller) which makes the transfer to the third country, but 
in fact has no contractual relationship with the data subject. In the absence of this 
however, unless the customer is deemed to be the controller and his bank the 
processor; it would appear that an intermediary bank would be unable to transfer 
personal data to a third country which does not ensure an adequate level of 
protection. One might argue that this problem is resolved by Art 26(1)(c) (similar to 
that of section 94(d) of the proposed POPIA) where provision is made for a 
contract concluded in the interest of the data subject between the controller and a 
third party. What makes this problematic, is the fact that the definitions allocated to 
controller and processor do not resolve the question of whether it is the customer 
or his bank (and subsequent banks in the chain) who would be deemed to be the 
controller in the transfer of funds. It must be asked therefore whether the bank in 
this case, would not be acting as a processor on behalf of the customer. This 
problem is seemingly overcome by the SALRC drafters improvising the use of the 
words individual and organisation, allowing these words to be interpreted as a data 
subject, processor or responsible party (controller under EC Directive). But, if this 
is to be argued, then it seems illogic for the drafters to have started the section by 
making use of the words responsible party and data subject instead of 
organisation and individual. It reads as follow: 
 
A responsible party in South Africa may transfer personal information about a data 
subject to someone (other than the responsible party or the data subject) who is in 
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a foreign country….if…(followed by the exceptions). To further illustrate the 
problem, here again, as mentioned earlier, since the execution of a payment order 
generally involves at least two data subjects (as seen above), if residents of third 
countries which do not ensure an adequate level of protection are to be protected, 
then the transfer which is envisaged must fall within one of the five categories of 
exceptions mentioned earlier with respect to all data subjects involved. This makes 
the interpretation of a data subject and the data subject difficult to follow and 
unclear to which data subject is referred.  
 
The use of individual and organisation is in my opinion ambiguous and causes 
doubt to whether individual could also further be read as a juristic person, or 
whether the juristic person is in fact the organisation. I will further discuss this 
below under Juristic Persons.54  
 
I find therefore that this exception is not sufficient to cover payment orders due to 
the ambiguity of its contents.   
 
3.2.3 The transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract 
concluded in the interest of the individual between the organisation and a 
third party 
 
This exception seemingly provide a solution for the use of intermediary banks 
during payment orders in the sense that it is not necessary for the individual to 
have a separate contract with the intermediary bank (and subsequent banks in the 
chain) as described above. On the basis of the wording it seems perfectly normal 
and acceptable.  However, in my opinion, it is not clear what is meant by 
“…concluded in the interest of the individual...”  
 
To sketch a scenario; if an individual’s personal information is transferred to the 
United States, a country that does not provide adequate data protection measures, 
and the individual’s personal information is then subjected to scrutiny, as for 
example through a summons that is issued under the US Patriot Act of 2001 by its 
subsequent authorities, is such a contract concluded then to be interpreted as “in 
                                                 
54
 See paragraph 3.3 below. 
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the interest” of the individual? I doubt it and can therefore not foresee that such an 
exception would suffice. This brings us to the next exception. 
 
3.2.4 All of the following apply: 
(i) the transfer is for the benefit of the individual; 
(ii) it is reasonably impracticable to obtain the consent of the data subject to 
that transfer; 
(iii) if it were reasonably practicable to obtain such consent, the individual 
would be likely to give it. 
 
Here as with the previous exception, it is hard to see how a payment order, would 
be validated under this exception. “Interest” is described in the Oxford English 
Dictionary as a “person’s advantage or benefit”, bringing benefit then within the 
context of interest, resulting in the same conclusion as argued above under par 
3.2.3. If one argued that the contract was concluded in the financial or economic 
interest or benefit of the individual, then it might indeed suffice, but this was clearly 
not the intention of the drafters since it would limit the scope and application of the 
act to a specific sector. It is stipulated by the POPIA that all three the above 
scenarios have to be present. Without the fulfilment of the first scenario, I find it 
unnecessary analyzing the remaining two paragraphs of the exception. This brings 
as to the first exception, which is dealt with last. 
 
3.2.5 The recipient of the information is subject to a law, binding scheme or 
contract which effectively upholds principles for fair handling of the 
information that are substantially similar to the Information Protection 
Principles set out in Chapter 3 of this Act 
 
This exception seems to be the only viable and unambiguous option for the 
execution of a payment order that has a beneficiary outside the borders of South 
Africa.  It is still unclear on who the task will rest to make the decision as to 
whether a law, binding scheme or contract does indeed effectively uphold the 
principles and on what criteria such a decision must rest. It is advisable that a 
working party as suggested in section 45 of the proposed POPIA does a 
preparation of a methodology for evaluating the adequacy, in similar fashion as 
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was done in 1998 by the Working Party established by Article 29 of the EU 
Directive on Data Protection. With regards to contracts, it is suggested that a 
section 45 working party, provides guidelines to such contractual clauses as is 
reflected in the Commission Staff Working Document on the implementation of the 
Commission decisions on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal 
data to third countries.55With regards to binding schemes, I suggest, if they could 
be interpreted as Binding Corporate Rules as I successfully or unsuccessfully tried 
to illustrate earlier56, a section 45 working party should follow the lead of the Article 
29 Working Party in its working document on binding corporate rules, adopted on 
3 June 2003 (‘WP74’).57If this could be done, without too many delays after 
enactment, it would most definitely provide clear guidelines for the various 
industries and sectors. This brings me to the issue surrounding the inclusion of 
juristic persons within the ambit of the proposed POPIA. 
 
3.3 Juristic Persons 
 
In the Issue Paper of the SALRC, the following points were made: 
 
• “Firstly, that the South African courts apply the common law principles 
developed for the protection of the privacy of natural persons also to juristic 
persons58: In Financial Mail (Pt) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd59 the court 
expressed the view that the actio iniuriarum should be available for a 
violation of the privacy of a juristic person even if one cannot, in the case of 
a juristic person, speak of feelings being outraged or offended. The basis 
for this protection is that privacy, like reputation  (fama), can be infringed 
without injured feelings.60 The court in Janit v Motor Industry Fund 
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 (2001/497/EC and 2002/16/EC). 
 
56
 See par. 2.1 above. 
 
57
 Working Document (WP74) Transfers of personal data to third countries: Applying Article 26(2) of the EU Data Protection 
Directive to Binding Corporate Rules for International Data Transfers, 11639/02/EN WP 74 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2003/wp74_en.pdf. (14 August 2007) 
 
58
 See Motor Industry Fund Administrators (Pty) Ltd v Janit supra at 60 (confirmed on appeal: 1995 4 SA 293 (A)) and 
Financial Mail v Sage Holdings supra 462-463; Neethling’s Law Of Personality 32 fn 336, 68ff, 71-73. 
 
59
 Supra 
 
60
 At 462; Neethling’s Law of Personality at 71. 
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Administrators (Pty) Ltd61 affirmed the view expressed in the Sage 
Holdings case that a company would be entitled to regard the confidential 
oral or written communications of its directors and employees as sacrosanct 
and would, in appropriate circumstances be entitled to enforce the 
confidentiality of such communications. Interestingly, in the Janit case, the 
view was articulated that the theft of confidential discussions of a board of 
directors constituted an unlawful invasion of their privacy and any 
disclosure of such information, would itself constitute an invasion of the 
respondent’s privacy.62Furthermore, where another person, who was aware 
that the information was unlawfully obtained and that they contained private 
and confidential discussions of the respondent’s directors, helped himself to 
that information, such a person thereby violated and infringed their right to 
privacy.63 
 
• In the second place the Constitution sets out the applicability of the Bill of 
Rights to a juristic person in s 8(4) of the Constitution which states: A juristic 
person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by 
the nature of the rights and the nature of that juristic person. 
 
• Thirdly, in Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences ao v 
Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd ao; In re Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd ao v Smit NO ao64 it was held that juristic persons 
enjoy the right to privacy, but is not protected to the same extent as natural 
persons since juristic persons are not the bearers of human dignity. The 
level of justification for any particular limitation of the right would have to be 
judged in the light of the circumstances of each case. 
 
• Finally, it was noted that it would appear that only natural persons (i.e. not 
juristic persons) are protected by the provisions of the Promotion of 
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 1995 (4) SA 293 AD. 
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 At 303. 
 
63
 At 305 B-D. 
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Access to Information Act, since “personal information” is defined as 
information about an identifiable individual.”656667 
 
In consideration of the above mentioned points, the SALRC proposed to include 
information pertaining to both natural and juristic persons in the ambit of the 
POPIA. The definition of “personal information” was therefore drafted to include a 
juristic person.68 It can be deduced that the definition of “data subject”, which 
means the person to whom personal information relate, includes a juristic person. 
 
This in itself might pose a problem with regards to the ease of how corporate 
financial transactions would be dealt with across borders. Currently there are four 
European Member States that apply their data protection laws to legal persons, 
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 The definition of “personal information in PAIA reads as follows: 
“Personal information” means information about an identifiable individual, including, but not limited to  
a)information relating to the race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, national, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, physical or mental health, well-being, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth of 
the individual; 
b) information relating to the education or the medical, criminal or employment history of the individual or information relating 
to financial transactions in which the individual has been involved; 
c) any identifying number, symbol or other particular assigned to the individual; 
d) the address, fingerprints or blood type of the individual; 
e) the personal opinions, views, or preferences of the individual, except where they are about another individual, or about a 
proposal for a grant, an award or a prize to be made to another individual; 
f) correspondence sent by the individual that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or confidential nature of further 
correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original correspondence; 
g) the views or opinions of another individual about the individual; 
h) the views or opinions of another individual about a proposal for a grant, an award or a prize to be made to the individual, 
but excluding the name of the other individual where it appears with the views or opinions of the other individual; and 
i) the name of the individual where it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the 
disclosure of the name itself would reveal information about the individual, but excludes information about an individual who 
has been dead for more than 20 years. 
 
66
 Roos thesis at 499 
 
67
 The definition of “personal information” in the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act is based on that of 
PAIA. It is furthermore interesting to observe that the Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA) lists amongst 
the grounds on which the refusal to grant access to the records of private persons is the mandatory protection of 
the privacy of a third party who is a natural person. No such exclusionary provision is made in respect of juristic persons. 
 
68
 “personal information” means information about an identifiable, natural person, and in so far as it is applicable, an 
identifiable, juristic person, including, but not limited to: 
a) information relating to the race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, national, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, physical or mental health, well-being, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth of 
the person; 
b) information relating to the education or the medical, criminal or employment history of the person or information relating to 
financial transactions in which the person has been involved; 
c) any identifying number, symbol or other particular assigned to the person; 
d) the address, fingerprints or blood type of the person; 
e) the personal opinions, views or preferences of the person, except where they are about another individual or about a 
proposal for a grant, an award or a prize to be made to another individual; 
f) correspondence sent by the person that is implicitly or explicitly of a private or confidential nature or further 
correspondence that would reveal the contents of the original correspondence; 
g) the views or opinions of another individual about the person; 
h) the views or opinions of another individual about a proposal for a grant, an award or a prize to be made to the person, but 
excluding the name of the other individual where it appears with the views or opinions of the other individual; and 
i) the name of the person where it appears with other personal information relating to the person or where the disclosure of 
the name itself would reveal information about the person; 
j) but excludes information about a natural person who has been dead, or a juristic person that has ceased to exist, for more 
than 20 years; 
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namely Austria, Denmark, Italy and Luxembourg. The other European members 
only apply their data protection laws to natural persons. As this already poses a 
harmony problem for inter European data transfers, it is obvious to see the 
implications this might have for financial transactions between South Africa and 
those European states that don’t offer protection laws to juristic or legal persons. 
As already mentioned earlier, section 94 of the proposed POPIA states that a 
responsible party in South Africa may transfer personal information about a data 
subject to someone (other than the responsible party or the data subject) who is in 
a foreign country only if – 
 
the recipient of the information is subject to a law, binding scheme or 
contract which effectively upholds principles for fair handling of the 
information that are substantially similar to the Information Protection 
Principles set out in Chapter 3 of this Act;  
 
It is my submission that in the absence of extending their protection to juristic 
persons, it would be doubtful whether it can be argued that recipients in such 
countries are subject to laws which effectively uphold principles for fair handling of 
the information. This would then imply that financial institutions or banks that 
transfer financial information related to its corporate customers would have to 
make provision for binding schemes or contracts for the majority of its European 
counterparts, rendering one of the initial purposes of section 94 obsolete. 
 
Some of the arguments by the SALRC for the inclusion of section 94 were for 
instance that trade with African countries would be more difficult than with Europe 
since adequacy will have to be established in each particular transfer. It further 
argued that the legislation will improve the country’s position regarding countries 
that do have proper legislation in place.69  
 
Although South Africa would probably fulfil the adequacy requirement as 
envisaged by Article 25 of the EC Directive on Data Protection, most of its 
European counterparts won’t fulfil the equivalent South African requirement, 
                                                 
69
 See http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/dp109_prj124/CH%207%20CROSS-
BORDER%20INFORMATION%20TRANSFERS.pdf (15 August 2007) View page 14 thereof. 
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making trade from South Africa between itself and Europe, just as difficult as trade 
with African countries.   
 
A good example with a two folded problem that might arise for banks would for 
instance be if a South African company transfers money to a European company. 
In doing so, most banks70 make use of SWIFT. SWIFT is a worldwide financial 
messaging service which facilitates international money transfers. SWIFT stores 
all messages for a period of 124 days at two operation centres, one within the EU 
and one in the USA – a form of data processing referred to as "mirroring". The 
messages contain personal data such as the names of the payer and payee. As a 
Belgian based cooperative, SWIFT is subject to Belgian data protection law 
implementing the EU Data Protection Directive.71  
 
The first side of the problem can be viewed as follow; since Belgian law does not 
extend its data protection to juristic persons, the South African bank will have to 
make use of binding schemes or contracts. This would be its only alternative, 
unless express consent (which is impractical as explained under my paragraph 
3.2.1) could be obtained from the data subject, since section 94 paragraphs c, d 
and e72 of the proposed POPIA only refer to an individual. As mentioned above in 
my paragraph 3.2.2 I will illustrate this point here. 
 
“Individual” is not defined in the proposed POPIA. The question would arise 
whether individual could refer to a juristic person. In South Africa, statutory 
interpretation in short is done by analysing the following methods; 
 
• Purpose of the legislation; 
o Constitutional demands; 
                                                 
70
 See http://www.swift.com/index.cfm?item_id=41766 (15 August 2007) 
71
 Opinion 10/2006 on the processing of personal data by the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication 
(SWIFT) by Article 29 Working Party adopted 22 November 2006. 
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 (c) the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the individual and the organisation, or for the 
implementation of pre-contractual measures taken in response to the data subject’s request; or 
(d) the transfer is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract concluded in the interest of the individual 
between the organisation and a third party; or 
(e) all of the following apply: 
(i) the transfer is for the benefit of the individual; 
(ii) it is reasonably impracticable to obtain the consent of the data subject to that transfer; 
(iii) if it were reasonably practicable to obtain such consent, the individual would be likely to give it. 
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o the primary rule of interpretation is to establish the purpose of 
legislation in the light of the Bill of Right; 
o Meaning of the text; 
o Balance of text and context; 
• Other basic principles; 
o Legislation must be read as a whole; 
o The presumption that legislation does not contain futile or 
nugatory provisions. 73 
 
From the above it would seem futile and nugatory if the drafters had not indeed 
intended the interpretation of the word “individual” to include a juristic person, 
taking the purpose of the proposed POPIA and the balance of the text and context 
seen from a constitutional perspective. However, without even having to analyse 
all the methods of interpretation above, an answer can be deduced from the issue 
paper presented by the SALRC. In the issue paper, it was noted that it would 
appear that only natural persons (i.e. not juristic persons) are protected by the 
provisions of the Promotion of Access to Information Act, since “personal 
information” is defined as information about an identifiable “individual”74. This then 
clearly links the word “individual” up with a natural person, and not a juristic 
person.   
 
The other side of the problem faced by banks is illustrated at the hand of the 
recent SWIFT investigation as explained by an opinion delivered by the 
Independent Centre for Privacy Protection at the federal state of Schleswig-
Holstein (ICPP) on August 23rd, 2006: 
 
“In international transfer of messages in relation to financial transfers 
between financial institutions the bank/ financial institution receiving an 
order by its customer is responsible for complying with privacy protection 
regulations and for the confidential use of personal data on its way to the 
financial institution receiving the transfer.  
                                                 
73
 Christo Botha, Statutory Interpretation: An introduction for students (4th ed. Juta 2005). 
  
74
 Own quotation. 
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The commissioned institutions as far as they have entrusted legally 
independent companies with data processing - especially forwarding of 
messages relating to financial transactions are responsible to ensure the 
level of data protection of the Federal Data Protection Act 
(Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, BDSG) in an unbroken chain by contract all the 
way to the data receiving financial institution.  
Involving third parties that assist with the forwarding of client data for the 
purpose of routing, a specific international wire transfer is a case of data 
processing on a commissioned basis under section 11 of the German 
Federal Data Protection Act (Bundesdatenschutzgesetz - BDSG). The bank 
instructed to transfer money is responsible for providing an unbroken chain 
of written contracts with all financial institutions involved guaranting (sic) a 
constantly high level of protection as required by the provisions of the 
Federal Data Protection Act and the data concerned.  
SWIFT acts as an agent or subcontractor of the data controller, the 
members of the SWIFT-group. At present, SWIFT does not provide for 
sufficient privacy protection guaranties that would justify transmitting 
personal data to be processed by SWIFT. Particularly lacking is a privacy 
protection measure comparable to the one provided in section 11 BDSG 
that would ensure SWIFT to be bound to instructions and confidential use of 
entrusted bank customers´ data.  
 
SWIFT maintains a database in the United States of America which 
includes data records of European citizens that do not have contractual 
relations to U.S. agencies or U.S. banks. The transfer of this data by 
SWIFT/Europe to SWIFT/U.S.A. is illegal due to the lack of a sufficient legal 
basis. So far measures to ensure an adequate level of data protection for 
customer data being processed in the USA after articles 25 and 26 of the 
EC directive have not been taken at all.”75  
 
In a report issued on November 22, 2006, the Article 29 Working Party concluded 
that SWIFT, which provided the US Department of Treasury (UDT) with access to 
large amounts of financial data emanating from large financial institutions world 
                                                 
75
 View https://www.datenschutzzentrum.de/wirtschaft/swift/060825_swift_en.htm (15 August 2007) 
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wide, as well as the financial institutions were jointly liable for the violation of EU 
Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC by transferring personal data in a “confidential, 
non-transparent and systematic manner for years.” 
 
This then would imply that it would also be illegal in terms of the South African 
proposed POPIA to make use of SWIFT, since its operations would, as above 
explained under articles 25 and 26, also lack a sufficient level of adequacy as 
required by section 94 of the proposed POPIA. 
 
To counter this problem in light of the case and its outcome, it is recommended 
that all companies and, in particular, banks, consider developing and implementing 
an action plan that will prepare them for future governmental demands for data. 
According to Jacqueline Klosek & Lauren Troxclair in their article titled: “Banks 
Need A Disclosure “Action Plan””76, it is suggested that a three step plan should be 
implemented.  
The first step mentioned is to plan ahead. Taking initiative by developing a 
proactive strategy is a responsive approach financial institutions can take to 
address some of the Working Party’s conclusions. They further suggest that 
financial institutions should specifically negotiate for data protection and privacy 
law compliance provisions in contracts with financial fund transfer services such as 
SWIFT.  
 
In the second step it is mentioned that financial institutions should be transparent 
and, where possible, obtain consent from its customers. One of the main concerns 
expressed by the Working Party in its report on this subject was the lack of 
transparency in the data sharing. The Working Party cited such lack of 
transparency as a key factor in the violation of fundamental European principles of 
data protection and in my opinion as would be the case in South Africa when the 
proposed POPIA is implemented. In light of this they recommend that financial 
institutions should consider implementing policies that outline the process for 
transferring personal data to government entities in response to valid and legally 
binding requests and they further suggest that financial institutions should 
                                                 
76
 Jacqueline Klosek & Lauren Troxclair, Banks Need A Disclosure “Action Plan”, Bank Technology News, June 2006, Vol 
20, Nr 6. 
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communicate such policies to customers. In addition to disclosing the potential for 
personal data transfers, financial institutions should also obtain prior consent from 
customers for potential personal data transfers, provided such transfers are made 
pursuant to valid and legally binding requests.  
 
In the third and final step, it is suggested that financial institutions should be broad 
with consumers and demand specificity from the government and business 
partner. When making disclosures to consumers and obtaining consumer consent 
to prospective disclosures, it is advisable to be as broad as possible. On the other 
hand, when contracting with other parties, it is recommended to include clauses 
that will restrict such parties from sharing information at all.  
 
Although the above three step procedure is not necessarily intended for a South 
African audience, I do feel that it could play a significant role in preventing South 
African banks from subjecting themselves to a similar situation, should the 
proposed POPIA be enacted. It is therefore suggested that in their contracts or 
binding schemes with such institutions as SWIFT, cognisance of the above steps 
should be taken.  
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4 Basel II and the proposed POPIA 
 
In this chapter I will try to demonstrate how current banking practices and the 
implementation of Basel II might send off on a collision course with the POPIA. It 
must however be emphasized that most of the provisions laid down for its 
implementation is still in its infancy and it is also not currently possible to get 
access to any of the recommendations made by the various banks related to Basel 
II, since none of it is publicly available. 
 
4.1 Basel II 
 
To illustrate the functions of Basel II and its relativity to the South African banking 
industry I find it best to refer to the summary as is noted in the Memorandum on 
the Objects of the Banks Amendment Bill, 2007:77 
 
“On 26 June 2004 the International Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision published an amended capital framework for banks entitled 
"International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: 
A Revised Framework", generally referred to and known as "Basel II". The 
primary objective of Basel II is to replace the 1988 Capital Accord to further 
strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system 
by the adoption of stronger risk management practices by the banking 
industry. Basel II has important implications for the capital frameworks of 
banks and the regulatory framework and supervisory processes applicable 
to banks. 
Given the potential negative effects of not implementing Basel II on the 
South African banking industry, it is prudent to implement Basel II in its 
entirety and to amend the legal framework to facilitate its implementation.
                                                 
77
 View http://www.treasury.gov.za/legislation/bills/2007/Memoranda%20on%20Objects%20-
%20Draft%20Banks%20Amendment%20Bill%202007.pdf (25 August 2007) 
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An Accord Implementation Forum ("AIF") was established to manage and 
co-ordinate the implementation of Basel II. The Registrar of Banks chairs 
the Steering Committee of the AIF and its members include delegates from 
National Treasury, various departments of the South African Reserve Bank, 
the banks and the auditing profession. The Regulatory Framework Sub-
Committee ("RFSC") of the Steering Committee was tasked to review the 
current legal framework relating to banks and to identify necessary 
amendments to give effect to Basel II.  
The RFSC identified a number of amendments to the Banks Act that are 
necessary to give effect to Basel II and assisted the Office of the Registrar 
of Banks in the drafting of the draft Banks Amendment Bill. The Bill is thus 
the result of an inclusive and consultative process between this Office, the 
banking industry and other role-players since 2004. 
The proposed implementation date for Basel II is 1 January 2008.” 
 
Basel II requires banks to collect and exchange huge amounts of data, including 
customer data which usually falls under data protection legislation. What is rather 
surprising is that none of these provisions were specifically made mention of in the 
Bank Amendments Bill. It is assumed that this data is needed to do the requested 
ratings in the future. In Europe a draft of the new EU capital requirement 
framework (EU Council Doc Nr. 12890/05 – “New Directive”)78 was issued. The 
rating provisions request the collection of huge amounts of data on their bank 
customers and banks already collect customer data of various kinds, including for 
example soft facts (like private/family issues of company managers). In a recent 
fact finding questionnaire by Rainer Knyrim on behalf of the International Chamber 
of Commerce (ICC)79, it was found that banks question whether they really have 
the right to collect and process this data which comes from many different sources 
and is collected partly without the customers’ knowledge. They also contended 
that the draft of the new directive does not give any useful help in solving this 
question. A question would be whether the South African drafters have themselves 
followed through in trying to resolve similar issues. 
                                                 
78
 View http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/bank/regcapital/index_en.htm#capitalrequire (25 August 2007) 
 
79View http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/e-
business/pages/Basel_II_questionnaire_and_answers_09_10_2006.pdf (25 August 2007) 
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The ICC also established that to do ratings and settle credit limits on large 
customers in Europe who are clients in different banks of a banking group, data 
needs to be exchanged both EU-wide as well as globally which leads to the well-
known data transfer problems. This problem from a South African perspective was 
discussed under my chapter 3.  
 
It was further implied that experience has shown that the argument of a prevailing 
interest of the bank is more difficult to argue in discussions with data protection 
authorities than was thought and international and national laws were not precise 
enough to serve as a legal basis for a transfer. 
 
In South Africa, this legal basis as referred to above, would for instance be derived 
from Section 9 (1) (c) of the proposed POPIA where it is stated  that personal 
information may only be processed where the processing is necessary in order to 
comply with a legal obligation to which the responsible party is subject. 
 
Hence the fact that no reference in the Bank Amendment’s Bill is made to data 
collection and subsequent processes which, in my opinion, would make it difficult 
for banks to argue that they do in fact have a legal basis for the transfer of data 
within the ambit of Basel II. In other words, it would be difficult to derive from the 
said Bill any obligation to collect, process or transfer any personal information. 
However, without having all the necessary resources available to me, it might be a 
premature and prejudice statement and I stand to be proven incorrect. It does 
however raise a viable question and from the experience drawn in Europe, 
illustrated above, needs to be taken note of. 
 
4.2 Relevant questions 
 
In verifying some of the issues, I will discuss a number of the questions that were 
asked in the mentioned ICC questionnaire at the hand of answers supplied by an 
anonymous South African bank. 
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These questions are as follow: 
 
Question 1: 
 
Does your bank already collect rating data on its customers to fulfil Basel II 
requirements? Is your bank already collecting or will it collect “soft facts” on its 
customers? Will it collect sensitive data like race, religion, health or criminal 
information of key personnel of your customer? Will your bank use data on its 
customers received from third parties? 
 
The SA bank replied as follow: (My comments in brackets) 
 
South African banks already collect data on most of their customers, however 
internal rating coverage is not yet complete. The banks retail portfolios are 
substantially complete and the corporate counterparties anticipate completion by 
the end of 2007. 
Banks collect data on most of their customers; however historic credit vetting data 
on unrated clients’ is generally in hard copy on file, not electronic. The banks 
expect to have uniform approach to managing electronic rating data and collect all 
counterparties’ data in electronic format by the end of 2007 to satisfy Basel II 
requirements. 
Banks collect data on key personnel (e.g. Directors/shareholders) where surety 
has been provided by them for the counterparty. As far as it would improve the 
estimation of credit risk, processes to expand data collection would be considered. 
Any sensitive data collected is subject to the Constitution of South Africa and 
where sensitive data is collected it is permitted under specific legislation such as 
Employment Equity Act etc. (This would qualify under the section 26 exemption to 
the prohibition on processing of personal information concerning a person’s race in 
the POPIA).80 
 
                                                 
80
 26. The prohibition on processing personal information concerning a person's race, as referred to in section 24, does not 
apply where the processing is carried out - 
(a) with a view to identifying data subjects and only where this is essential for that purpose; 
(b) for the purpose of assigning a preferential status to a person from a particular ethnic or cultural group with a view to 
eradicating or reducing actual historical or socio-economic inequalities, provided that the data subject has not indicated any 
objection thereto in writing. 
 
  41 
 
Bank staff that are dismissed due to criminal offences are listed on The Banking 
Association REDS data base for use by Human Resources managers within the 
Banking Industry only. (This would qualify as I assume under the section 30 
exemption to the prohibition on processing of personal information concerning a 
person’s criminal behaviour in the POPIA.)81 
 
At present entities within a banking group can share counterparty data whilst 
external data source (Bureau Agencies e.g. Experian & ITC) can be purchased or 
acquired to enhance risk estimation. Intended Privacy Legislation will require the 
consent of the customer. (With regards to the further processing principle in 
section 14 of the POPIA, I doubt whether entities within a banking group would be 
allowed to share counterpart data unless the preconditions are met.)82  
                                                 
81
 30.(1) The prohibition on processing personal information concerning a person's criminal behaviour, as referred to in 
section 24, does not apply where the processing is carried out by bodies, charged by law with applying criminal law and by 
responsible parties who have obtained this information in accordance with the law. 
(2) The prohibition does not apply to responsible parties who process this information for their own purposes with a view to: 
 (a) assessing an application by data subjects in order to take a decision about them or 
provide a service to them, or 
(b) protecting their interests, provided that this concerns criminal offences which have been or, as indicated by certain facts 
and circumstances, can be expected to be committed against them or against persons in their service. 
(3) The processing of this information concerning personnel in the service of the responsible 
party must take place in accordance with the rules established in compliance with labour legislation. 
(4) The prohibition on processing other personal information, as referred to in section 24, does not apply where this is 
necessary to supplement the processing of information on criminal behaviour, for the purposes for which this information is 
being processed. 
(5) The provisions of subsections (2) to (4) are likewise applicable to personal information relating to a ban imposed by a 
court concerning unlawful or objectionable conduct. 
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 14. (1) Personal information must not be further processed in a way incompatible with a purpose for which it has been 
collected in terms of principle 2. 
(2) For the purposes of assessing whether processing is incompatible, as referred to under subsection (1), the responsible 
party must take account of the following - 
(a) the relationship between the purpose of the intended further processing and the purpose for which the information has 
been obtained; 
(b) the nature of the information concerned; 
(c) the consequences of the intended further processing for the data subject; 
(d) the manner in which the information has been obtained, and 
(e) any contractual rights and obligations existing between the parties. 
(3) The further processing of personal information must not be regarded as incompatible as referred to under subsection (1) 
where - 
(a) the processing of the information for that other purpose is authorised by the data subject; or 
(b) the source of the information is a publicly available publication; or 
(c) non-compliance is necessary - 
(i) to avoid prejudice to the maintenance of the law by any public body, including the prevention, detection, investigation, 
prosecution, and punishment of offences; or 
(ii) for the enforcement of a law imposing a pecuniary penalty; or 
(iii) for the protection of the public revenue; or 
(iv) for the conduct of proceedings before any court or tribunal (being 
proceedings that have been commenced or are reasonably in contemplation); or 
(v) in the interests of national security; or 
(d) the processing of the information for that other purpose is necessary to prevent or mitigate a serious and imminent threat 
to: 
(i) public health or public safety; or 
(ii) the life or health of the data subject or another individual; or 
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Question 2: 
 
To settle credit limits on large customers which are clients in different banks of a 
banking group, will your bank exchange customer/rating data within its banking 
group or with other banks/third parties? Will this transfer involve cross border data 
flow outside the EU? 
 
The SA bank replied as follow: (My comments in brackets) 
 
Within a banking group, individual banks will exchange rating data; however 
sharing with other banks/third parties would be subject to the arrangement 
between the parties. (In terms of section 9 of the POPIA, I doubt whether this will 
be allowed unless the exceptions are applied.)83 
A bank may enquire with another bank for a rating of the client using an industry 
coding system that qualifies a client’s transaction behaviour related to risk profile. 
E.g.: a cheque issued in settlement of a debt could be verified by the issuing bank 
i.e. good for funds. (Note my previous comment.) 
In South Africa no restriction exists on cross border data flow and South Africa 
banks will share data with their African and EU operations. (This will change in 
terms of section 94 of the POPIA.)84 
 
The number of questions is numerous and I will not go through all of them. The 
point that I do however try to establish is that there is definitely areas of conflict 
between the implementation of Basel II and the proposed POPIA. These are not 
necessarily problems that are insurmountable. There are enough exclusions in the 
proposed POPIA that might render the processing under Basel II legitimate, but 
from a practical banking perspective it might prove costly.  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
(e) the information is used for historical, statistical or scientific purposes where the responsible party has made the 
necessary arrangements to ensure that the further processing is carried out solely for these specific purposes and will not 
be published in a 
form from which the identity of the data subject may be established or inferred; or 
(f) the further processing of the information is in accordance with an authority granted 
under section 33 (exemptions) of this Act. 
 
83
 Ibid note 82. 
 
84
 Refer to pages 13 and 14. 
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I do not believe that proposed POPIA sufficiently or clearly covers the Basel II data 
protection issues, and in the face of such uncertainty, banks will have to adopt a 
conservative approach and try and obtain customer consent in most cases, at a 
significant procedural and monetary cost to the banks. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
A survey of access to information laws and practices in 14 countries was done by 
the Open Society Initiative and published in its Justice in Action Series, tilted, 
Transparency and Silence. They had the following to say about South Africa: 
 
“South Africa, the only monitored country in Africa with a freedom of 
information law in place, demonstrated greater compliance with the right to 
information than the other four African countries. However, only 19 percent 
of the requests submitted in South Africa yielded a compliant outcome and 
only 13 percent yielded information. This is by far the lowest score of the 
seven monitored countries with freedom of information laws. Justice 
Initiative monitoring exercises in both 2003 and 2004 highlighted serious 
problems with the implementation of South Africa’s Promotion to Access of 
Information Act (Act No. 2 of 2 February 2000), and these problems 
resulted in high levels of mute refusals in response to requests. Although 
the law is strong on paper, it has proved complex to implement in practise, 
and there have not been sufficient efforts to make its implementation a 
priority. Better implementation might yet make it a model for the region.” 
 
Clearly this is the last sort of comment that South Africa needs on the 
implementation of its proposed POPIA. Currently, as the draft stands, it is however 
not unforeseeable that such comment might well be read into its implementation, 
since some of its provisions might also prove too complex to implement in 
practise, especially seen from the banking industry’s perspective. 
 
Some of the issues that were raised in this thesis are for instance the cross border 
data transfer problems related to payment orders. Other problems indicated were 
those concerning fraud, Basel II and the legally non-binding codes of conduct that 
is currently laying the guidelines for banking practices with regards to its 
consumers.
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The question would be whether there is a golden one rule solution. I sincerely 
doubt this. It is my contention that an array of various factors must play a role in 
seeing the proposed POPIA through to its successful implementation. Such factors 
would include safe harbour agreements, technological solutions, and sector 
specific regulations in the form of privacy code of conducts. 
 
For South African banks to operate successfully in Africa, specifically in the SADC 
region (SADC stands for ‘Southern African Development and Economic 
Community’ and refers to 14 African nations85 in Southern Africa, who have signed 
a mutual trade and co-operation agreement) it is my suggestion that South Africa 
sign a safe harbour agreement86 with the other members of SADEC, similar to that 
as between the USA and the EU, but with the exception that it also makes 
provision for financial institutions,. None of theses countries87 currently make 
provision for data protection in its laws. Without such an agreement, banks might 
be strained along in subjecting themselves to unnecessarily high costs in its strive 
to comply with the proposed POPIA.  In signing such an agreement however, time 
limits must be set on these countries to implement similar legislation, encouraging 
them to step up its own democratic values in ensuring sufficient privacy measures 
and achieving the objectives and vision as set by SADC.88  This would then set a 
standard for the rest of Africa and hopefully spirit them on to reach similar goals. 
 
It is also suggested that similar safe harbour agreements must be concluded 
between South Africa and some of its other trading partners. Some of these major 
trading partners include the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, Italy, 
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 These countries include Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Kingdom of Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. For further information, see 
http://www.sadc.int/home.php (24 August 2007) 
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 See http://www.export.gov/safeharbor/ (24 August 2007) for a detailed discussion on the safe harbour agreement. 
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 Ibid note 85. 
88
 The objectives of SADC as stated in Article 5 of the Treaty are to: Achieve development and economic growth, alleviate 
poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged 
through regional integration; Evolve common political values, systems and institutions; Promote and defend peace and 
security; Promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-reliance, and the interdependence of Member 
States; Achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes; Promote and maximise 
productive employment and utilisation of resources of the Region; Achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and 
effective protection of the environment; Strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural affinities 
and links among the people of the Region.  
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Belgium, and Japan, although it would only be foreseen that such an agreement 
be reached between South Africa and the United States, since the other five do 
make provision for adequate measures. 
 
Technological advances also have a role to play. Paul Rosenzweig and Alane 
Kochems89 explain that technology is both a problem and a solution for the issues 
posed by enhanced information collection systems. It can facilitate access to and 
the accumulation of large amounts of data; however, if that access is not properly 
managed, the information can be misused. When designed with proper 
procedures and protections and combined with oversight, technology can provide 
a reasonable balance between security and privacy. They continue by stating that 
in properly determining how best to enhance both liberty and security, it is useful 
to have some basic principles for assessing data protection technologies. They 
contend that such a list might include the following:  
 
• The data protection technology should allow for clear audit tracks to prevent 
data alteration or identify when data have been changed.  
• The technology should have a means to provide graduated levels of access 
to the data.  
• The technology should have protocols for enforcing the confidentiality and 
security of the data.  
 
There are multiple approaches to securing data. One means is following one of the 
many published information security standards; another is to protect the most 
sensitive data through encryption. They conclude by stating that controlling access 
to data and making sure that entities only have the appropriate level of access is 
critical if privacy interests are to be protected. Various software companies have 
adapted its data collection programs to make provision for legislation. A number of 
academic writers90 are also of the point of view that the solution would be in the 
                                                 
89
 Their article titled “Data Protection: Safeguarding Privacy in a New Age of Technology” can be viewed at: 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/lm16.cfm (26 August 2007) 
 
90
 Lessig, Lawrence in “Code and other Laws of Cyberspace”, Reidenberg, Joel R. in “Lex Informatica: The Formulation of 
Information Policy Rules Through Technology”, Texas Law Review, University of Texas at Austin School of Law 
Publications, 76 (3) 1998 pp. 553-584, Rotenberg, Marc in “Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy” (What 
Larry Doesn’t Get), Stanford Technology Law Review, Cite as: 2001 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 1 
http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/01_STLR_1 (22 August 2007) 
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code and that lex informatica could be a useful policy device. But this is a 
discussion in its own right. The fact that technology would and in fact must play a 
role is unmistakable and its contributory role in the banking industry could provide 
solutions to successful implementation of the proposed POPIA. 
 
The last and probably most crucial factor is the facilitation of sector based codes of 
conduct. The solution does not necessarily arrive with the issuing of the codes 
themselves, but rather through a pre-emptive strike and pro-active based effort on 
behalf of the specific sectors, in this case the banking industry, to submit such 
codes to the Commissioner. If the banks sit back and wait for the Commissioner to 
issue these codes, problems might arise as to the interim position on the 
implementation and interpretation of the proposed POPIA. Having regard to the 
specific related problems that might arise from the banking industry’s perspective, 
as was mentioned earlier, courts could create precedents91, which in the absence 
of such co-regulatory structures, could be detrimental to the industry as a whole. 
With its sector based knowledge, it is therefore suggested that the banking 
industry, or financial industry as a whole, make sure that they have these codes of 
conduct or privacy codes ready for submission when the proposed POPIA 
becomes enacted, thereby annihilating any room for an uncertain interim period 
that might be subject to scrutiny. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91
 See for instance Unitas v Van Wyk & Naude case nr 231/2005. Sec 50 – meaning of “required” for exercise or protection 
of right – when available to compel pre-action production. The threshold of “required” was set very high due to uncertainty 
on whether to use the Promotion to Access of Information Act (PAIA). PAIA was not the appropriate remedy. Discovery 
would probably have been successful in this delictual action. 
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